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Abstract
A pressing need for interrater reliability in the diagnosis of mental dis-
orders emerged during the mid-twentieth century, prompted in part by
the development of diverse new treatments. The Diagnostic and Statisti-
cal Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), third edition answered this need
by introducing operationalized diagnostic criteria that were ﬁeld-tested
for interrater reliability. Unfortunately, the focus on reliability came at a
time when the scientiﬁc understanding of mental disorders was embry-
onic and could not yield valid disease deﬁnitions. Based on accreting
problems with the current DSM-fourth edition (DSM-IV) classiﬁca-
tion, it is apparent that validity will not be achieved simply by reﬁning
criteria for existing disorders or by the addition of new disorders. Yet
DSM-IV diagnostic criteria dominate thinking about mental disorders
in clinical practice, research, treatment development, and law. As a re-
sult, the modern DSM system, intended to create a shared language, also
creates epistemic blinders that impede progress toward valid diagnoses.
Insights that are beginning to emerge from psychology, neuroscience,
and genetics suggest possible strategies for moving forward.
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Disorder: generally
used to describe a
medical condition or
abnormality
conferring harm or
risk of harm in which
etiology or pathologic
processes are unknown
Classification: an
organizing structure
imposed on data to
achieve a speciﬁc
purpose. No
classiﬁcation is perfect
or without
controversy, not even
the classiﬁcation of
living organisms that
dates from Linnaeus
Disease: generally
used to describe a
medical condition or
abnormality
conferring harm or
risk of harm in which
etiology or pathologic
processes
(pathophysiology) are
known
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INTRODUCTION
The tendency has always been strong to be-
lieve that whatever received a name must be
an entity or being, having an independent ex-
istence of its own.
John Stuart Mill
This is an important time to reﬂect on the
state of diagnosis for mental disorders, as both
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, fourth edition (DSM-IV; Am. Psychi-
atr. Assoc. 1994) and the International Classiﬁca-
tion of Diseases, tenth edition (ICD-10, World
Health Org. 1992), Chapter V, Mental and
Behavioural Disorders, are being revised in
preparation for DSM-V and the ICD-11.
These revision processes face complex compet-
ing demands. On the one hand, it is critical
that these classiﬁcations be open and respon-
sive to new discoveries just beginning to emerge
from psychology, neuroscience, and genetics
else progress toward valid disease deﬁnitions
will not occur. On the other hand, alterations
in the criteria for existing disorders may under-
cut existing bodies of research, such as apparent
prevalence (Crino et al. 2005) and, to some de-
gree, the applicability of existing clinical trials
data. More substantial changes to criteria may
force alterations in patterns of clinical practice
and disrupt the large array of administrative
uses to which the classiﬁcation manuals are put.
The DSM-IV (Am. Psychiatr. Assoc. 1994)
and the closely related ICD-10 (World Health
Org. 1992) organize the universe of mental
disorders. The disorders contained therein are
heuristics that have proven extremely useful in
clinical practice and research, especially by cre-
ating a common language that can be applied
with reasonably good interrater reliability.
Unfortunately, the disorders within these clas-
siﬁcations are not generally treated as heuristic,
but to a great degree have become reiﬁed.
Disorders within the DSM-IV or ICD-10 are
often treated as if they were natural kinds,
real entities that exist independently of any
particular rater (Kendell & Jablensky 2003). In
research, for example, DSM-IV criteria must
be used in order to satisfy most grant-making
bodies, journal reviewers and editors, and
organizers of scientiﬁc meetings. In the clinic,
DSM-IV diagnoses inﬂuence treatment choice
and determine eligibility for reimbursement.
DSM-IV diagnoses are taught to trainees in
psychology, psychiatry, and other ﬁelds, and
are often memorized for certiﬁcation exam-
inations. It is rare for alternative diagnostic
approaches to be tested (see sidebar Autobio-
graphical Notes from a Reluctant Nosologist;
Hyman & Fenton 2003). Moreover, there are
signiﬁcant conceptual and regulatory stumbling
blocks in the way of developing treatments
for conditions that do not match the criterion
lists contained within the DSM-IV. This is
illustrated by the regulatory challenges that had
to be met in order to develop treatments for
the cognitive deﬁcits that are characteristic of
schizophrenia.
Despite the success of both ﬁrst- and
second-generation antipsychotic drugs for
treatment of the hallucinations and delusions
(positive symptoms) of schizophrenia, indi-
viduals with this illness remain signiﬁcantly
disabled. Much of the treatment-refractory
156 Hyman
A
nn
u.
 R
ev
. C
lin
. P
sy
ch
ol
. 2
01
0.
6:
15
5-
17
9.
 D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 ar
jou
rna
ls.
an
nu
alr
ev
iew
s.o
rg
by
 1
28
.1
03
.2
38
.1
51
 o
n 
04
/0
6/
10
. F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
ANRV407-CP06-07 ARI 22 February 2010 15:10
disability of schizophrenia had been shown to
result from cognitive deﬁcits (Green 1996).
These reﬂect abnormal functioning of the pre-
frontal cerebral cortex, resulting in impairment
of working memory and thus the ability to con-
trol thought and behavior in conformity with
internally represented goals (Bowie et al. 2006,
Cannon et al. 2002, Tan et al. 2006). As was al-
ready apparent, albeit only documented later in
a large trial (Keefe et al. 2007), existing treat-
ments had only modest therapeutic effects on
cognitive symptoms of schizophrenia. Thus, in
the late 1990s it seemed important, as a pub-
lic health matter, for the National Institute of
Mental Health (NIMH) to encourage relevant
therapeutic research (Hyman & Fenton 2003).
At ﬁrst it seemed odd that the pharmaceu-
tical industry and its academic partners had
not already undertaken a signiﬁcant effort to
address cognitive symptoms of schizophrenia,
but it soon became clear that this was not
a simple matter. The hurdles were not only
scientiﬁc—in fact, useful scientiﬁc leads al-
ready existed—but also included the role of the
DSM-IV (Am. Psychiatr. Assoc. 1994) in de-
termining what could constitute an appropriate
indication for treatment development. The
DSM-IV makes no mention of the cognitive
symptoms of schizophrenia because the criteria
were based on older conceptions that focused
largely on positive symptoms and noncognitive
negative symptoms. Given the status of the
DSM-IV criteria as the community consensus,
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
held that it could not, by itself, recognize the
cognitive symptoms of schizophrenia as an
indication for the development and approval of
new treatments. Thus, it took a series of special
meetings convened by the NIMH and FDA,
academia, and the pharmaceutical industry to
create a process that would lead to the recogni-
tion of the cognitive symptoms of schizophrenia
as a valid indication (Buchanan et al. 2005).
The existence of this hurdle highlights the
regulatory role of the DSM-IV and therefore
the need to improve the validity of the system.
The current classiﬁcation also exerts a
signiﬁcant inﬂuence beyond the clinic and the
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES FROM A
RELUCTANT NOSOLOGIST
To me, nosology seemed a bit like stamp collecting, an absorb-
ing activity perhaps, but not a vibrant area of inquiry. During
my period as director of the National Institute of Mental Health
(NIMH) from 1996–2001, I came to realize, however, that the
DSM-III-R (Am. Psychiatr. Assoc. 1987) and its successor, the
DSM-IV (Am. Psychiatr. Assoc. 1994), exerted enormous inﬂu-
ence both for good and ill on the research funded by the Institute.
The DSM system was a critical platform for research that made
possible shared understandings of disease models or affected pop-
ulations under study. At the same time, it created an unintended
epistemic prison that was palpably impeding scientiﬁc progress.
Outside of their ongoing research projects, most investigators un-
derstood that the DSM-IV was a heuristic, pending the advance
of science. In practice, however, DSM-IV diagnoses controlled
the research questions they could ask, and perhaps, even imagine.
The Initial Review Groups (study sections) that evaluated
grant applications that came to the NIMH almost always required
the use of DSM criteria in proposed scientiﬁc studies. Similarly,
journals editors and referees generally required the use of these
criteria in research submitted for publication. In addition, regu-
latory agencies, such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), understandably took the DSM criteria to represent the
scientiﬁc community consensus on valid indications for the ap-
proval of new treatments. Even animal studies that purported to
develop disease models, whether by environmental interventions
or genetic engineering, were often judged by how closely they
approximated DSM disorders. It became a source of real worry
to me, that as Institute director, I might be signing off on the
expenditure of large sums of taxpayers’ money for clinical and
translational projects that almost never questioned the existing
diagnostic categories despite their lack of validation. Moreover,
there seemed to be very little, if any, research aimed at improving
this parlous situation.
My alarm was heightened when, early in my tenure, negative
results were reported from several genetic linkage studies. I was
bafﬂed that many (although thankfully not all) research groups
had been funded to collect only enough phenotype data to diag-
nose DSM-III-R (Am. Psychiatr. Assoc. 1987) or DSM-IV (Am.
Psychiatr. Assoc. 1994) disorders, as if these were natural kinds
that would map onto the human genome. Although in retrospect,
the linkage methods of the 1990’s have proven inadequate, the
DSM deﬁnitions of the disorders under investigation might
well have doomed these expensive projects before they started.
www.annualreviews.org • The Diagnosis of Mental Disorders 157
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The problematic effects of diagnostic reiﬁcation were revealed
repeatedly in genetic studies, imaging studies, clinical trials, and
types of studies where the rigid, operationalized criteria of the
DSM-IV deﬁned the goals of the investigation despite the fact
that they appeared to be poor mirrors of nature (Hyman 2007).
Reliability: interrater
reliability means that
two observers will
reach the same
diagnosis with high
probability for a given
patient examined at
approximately the
same time. Test-retest
reliability means that
the same person will
receive the same
diagnosis if examined
at reasonably close
time intervals
Validity: means that a
diagnosis picks out a
“natural kind” based
on etiology or
pathophysiology
Nosology: the branch
of medical science
dealing with disease
classiﬁcation
laboratory. The most recent version of the
DSM system, the Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revi-
sion (DSM-IV-TR; Am. Psychiatr. Assoc. 2000),
explicitly warns that the classiﬁcation is made
against the background of an evolving ﬁeld and
that its diagnoses were not meant to control un-
derstandings outside the realms of clinical prac-
tice and research:
It is to be understood that inclusion here, for
clinical and research purposes, of a diagnos-
tic category such as Pathological Gambling
or Pedophilia does not imply that the con-
dition meets legal or other nonmedical crite-
ria for what constitutes mental disease, mental
disorder, or mental disability. (Am. Psychiatr.
Assoc. 2000, p. xxxvii)
What real alternatives are available to non-
clinical communities? Despite the “cautionary
statement,” for individuals with problem gam-
bling or their advocates, the idea that they
might have a “real” disorder that undermines
self-control, might prove quite welcome. If
pathological gambling is broadly accepted as a
disorder, individuals with symptoms might ben-
eﬁt from improved access to treatment and a
plausible explanation for their behavior that di-
minishes attributions of responsibility and thus
stigma. Although others, ranging from prose-
cutors to insurance companies, might be skep-
tical of the designation as a disorder on the basis
of factors ranging from established legal views
of self-control (Morse 2004) to economic self-
interest, they are far less likely to question the
existence of a class of pathological gamblers. In-
deed, scientiﬁc and clinical communities may
not question the class or the structure within
which it exits.
In this review, I am not arguing against
the possibility that pathological gambling rep-
resents signiﬁcantly disordered behavior that
might have a discoverable neural basis and that
warrants treatment. I am not arguing that the
world would be better off without a shared lan-
guage to diagnose mental disorders. What I am
arguing is that cautionary statements within the
DSM-IV, if read at all, provide little protection
among many communities of users against reiﬁ-
cation of the disorders listed within. For exam-
ple, in the case of pathological gambling and
other impulse-control disorders, it is not cur-
rently clear what a “valid” and clinically use-
ful classiﬁcation would look like. Is lumping
better than breaking out every behavior that
can become compulsive into a listed or candi-
date disorder, such as gambling, shopping, In-
ternet use, or sexual activity? Would research
results make more sense and clinical care be im-
proved if a classiﬁcation lumped goal-directed
behaviors characterized by signiﬁcant loss of
control? Would it ultimately prove better to
ground these diagnoses in a shared liability fac-
tor, such as a disordered interaction between
mesotelencephalic brain reward circuits and
prefrontal cortical circuits underlying cogni-
tive control? How might a classiﬁcation best
handle the pathological gambler who is also a
compulsive user of alcohol and tobacco? Does
this person warrant three diagnoses, as would
currently be the case? Is pathological gambling
a category that is discontinuous from health,
as portrayed in the DSM-IV, or does it dif-
fer from normal behavioral variation only by
degree? Whether categorical or quantitative,
how might defensible thresholds be set to in-
dicate a point at which common human behav-
ior, such as gambling or shopping, would jus-
tiﬁably be considered pathological and come
under the purview of mental health profes-
sionals? If DSM-V and ICD-11 maintain the
fundamental structure created by the DSM-
III, the answers to these important open ques-
tions will be treated de facto as settled. I list
these initial questions to illustrate the ease by
which widely accepted systems of classiﬁcation
can morph into epistemic blinders that impede
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scientiﬁc progress. In the case of the DSM sys-
tem and its progeny, the unintended reiﬁcation
of diagnostic entities is facilitated by the lack of
a developed scientiﬁc base, combined with the
wide embrace of a classiﬁcation system devel-
oped, above all, to foster interrater reliability.
The committee members (of which I am cur-
rently one) charged with revising the DSM-IV
and ICD-10 thus face a paradoxical task: They
must be wary of undercutting a broadly shared
language with the attendant risk of leaving con-
fusion in their wake; at the same time, they must
be aware that if unchanged, this language, based
on a science more than four decades old and in
some cases more than a century old, will fur-
ther calcify what I argue is a highly problematic
status quo.
THE BENEFITS AND COSTS
OF PRIORITIZING INTERRATER
RELIABILITY
Given the lack of objective diagnostic tests for
mental disorders, the difﬁculties facing both
clinicians and researchers needing to agree on
the diagnosis of any given patient has been a
concern for at least half a century (Beck et al.
1962). The foundation of diagnostic agreement
is a shared classiﬁcation system that contains
diagnoses that can be applied reliably, mean-
ing that different raters can achieve diagnostic
agreement a high percentage of the time.
Reliable and widely shared disease deﬁni-
tions are a necessary antecedent for rational
treatment decisions. Diagnosis guides a clin-
ician’s thinking about treatment, about other
symptoms that might be present, about likely
impairments, and about prognosis. Shared and
reliable diagnoses are the cornerstone of com-
munication between the clinician and the pa-
tient and, where appropriate, with families,
other caregivers, and institutions. Diagnosis
is also central to translational and clinical re-
search: Without clear diagnostic guideposts, id-
iosyncratic groupings confound clinical trials,
epidemiology, genetics, imaging, and other lab-
oratory studies. In their absence, academia and
industry lack indications for which to develop
Diagnostic criteria:
rules for making
diagnoses. The
Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders,
Fourth Edition, Text
Revision (1990) and
ICD-10, Chapter V
(Mental Disorders)
provide both
classiﬁcations and
diagnostic criteria.
Other chapters of the
ICD-10 lack criteria
new treatments, and regulatory agencies cannot
judge efﬁcacy. Diagnosis also plays an impor-
tant role outside the clinic and laboratory, inﬂu-
encing, for example, insurance reimbursement,
determinations of disability, school-based inter-
ventions for symptomatic children, and diverse
legal proceedings.
In general medicine, the availability of ob-
jective tests and shared laboratory standards has
meant that interrater reliability is often taken
for granted. The lack of objective tests for men-
tal disorders, in contrast, makes diagnostic reli-
ability a difﬁcult problem. Given the early state
of the science, the DSM-III (Am. Psychiatr.
Assoc. 1980) had to rely on phenomenology:
symptoms, signs, and course of illness as the ba-
sis for diagnosis. In order to forge phenomenol-
ogy into clearly applicable rules for making di-
agnoses, the DSM-III reduced this information
to operationalized diagnostic criteria that were
ﬁeld tested for interrater reliability. This ap-
proach was also embraced within the ICD-9
chapter on Mental and Behavioural Disorders
(World Health Org. 1977). Operationalization
means that concepts are deﬁned in terms of
speciﬁc observations or measures. The obser-
vations and measures that contributed to the
diagnostic criteria were selected to be readily
ascertainable in clinical settings. For example,
the DSM-III requires six months of continu-
ous illness at some point in a person’s life to
make a diagnosis of schizophrenia (Am. Psychi-
atr. Assoc. 1980). However, the six-month crite-
rion illustrates the tradeoff that occurs between
speciﬁcity and arbitrariness when interrater re-
liability is desired but scientiﬁc information is
lacking. There is no empirical basis for select-
ing six months as a cutoff, but it gives a kind
of precision to the diagnosis of schizophrenia
that it would lack if the deﬁnition simply asked
that symptoms be “chronic.” Indeed the ICD-
10 (World Health Org. 1992) requires only that
one of the cardinal symptoms be present for
one month or more. Both manuals have the
same intentions, but such arbitrary differences
in operationalization inﬂuence measurements
of prevalence and selection of subjects for re-
search and treatment.
www.annualreviews.org • The Diagnosis of Mental Disorders 159
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The signiﬁcant heterogeneity of clinical
presentations presents a challenge to highly
speciﬁed, operationalized deﬁnitions. In at-
tempting to handle heterogeneity without
sacriﬁcing reliability, DSM-III (Am. Psychiatr.
Assoc. 1980) made the diagnostic criteria
polythetic, meaning that diagnoses can be
arrived at by choosing among different com-
binations of speciﬁc operationalized criteria
listed under a disorder. For example, the
diagnosis of major depression requires that
a patient meet ﬁve of the nine listed criteria
for at least two weeks. Although superﬁcially
sensible, this solution does not fully capture
the heterogeneous presentations of mental
disorders as is discussed below. Moreover, it
created a new kind of problem: Two individuals
with identical diagnoses of major depression
might be alike on as few as one of the nine
criteria (given that ﬁve are needed to make the
diagnosis), creating signiﬁcant challenges for
interpreting the results of research conducted
on putatively homogeneous populations.
In comparison with DSM-III, its predeces-
sor volumes DSM-I and -II were slim compen-
dia that lacked clear guidance as to how diag-
noses were to be made. DSM-I and DSM-II
followed on a tradition of classiﬁcations meant
largely to permit the collection of health statis-
tics. They do not appear to have been very
inﬂuential in clinical practice or research and
did not have signiﬁcant global inﬂuence. Thus,
for example, as a result of differing approaches
to diagnosis, it appeared in the 1970s that
schizophrenia might be twice as prevalent in
the United States as in Great Britain (Cooper
et al. 1972, Pope & Lipinski 1978). Such dif-
ferences in rates of diagnosis represented more
than an academic problem. With the discovery
of lithium therapy, which is efﬁcacious for bipo-
lar disorder but not for schizophrenia (Leucht
et al. 2003), it became critical to get these diag-
noses right. Did these transatlantic differences
reﬂect true differences in prevalence or did they
result from divergent approaches to diagnosis?
After the DSM-III (Am. Psychiatr. Assoc.
1980) deﬁned schizophrenia as a chronic illness
(based on the six-month criterion mentioned
above), the differences in prevalence between
Great Britain and the United States melted
away. The differences had resulted from the
fact that unlike British practitioners, American
practitioners had made diagnoses of both acute
and chronic forms of schizophrenia. As a result
of DSM-III, acute schizophrenia disappeared
as a diagnosis. There was, in addition, poten-
tial therapeutic beneﬁt to a subset of patients
who were rediagnosed from acute schizophre-
nia to bipolar disorder (Pope & Lipinski 1978)
with the implication that they might receive a
therapeutic trial of lithium.
Despite marked improvements over DSM-I
and DSM-II, neither the DSM-III (Am. Psychi-
atr. Assoc. 1980) nor any phenomenologically
based diagnostic system can fully solve the re-
liability problem. In clinical encounters, infor-
mation must be elicited from patients who may
lack insight into their symptoms as a result of
their illness or who may have complex motives
ranging from shame to paranoid ideation to
drug-seeking that inﬂuence reporting of symp-
toms. Moreover, it can prove quite difﬁcult to
interpret the diagnostic signiﬁcance of some
symptoms, e.g., whether a particular highly
overvalued idea represents an obsession or a
psychotic delusion. Ultimately, a laboratory-
based system will be required in order to
make additional substantial improvements in
reliability.
CLASSIFICATION
Classiﬁcations are cognitive structures imposed
on data to achieve particular goals. Given the
complexity of human psychology, biology, and
illness, any classiﬁcation in these realms is likely
to be plagued by stubborn bits of data that refuse
to ﬁt neatly into uniform, well-ordered classes
(see sidebar The Challenges of Classiﬁcation
in Living Systems). There is a reasonable con-
sensus that the goals of a classiﬁcation of men-
tal disorders should be optimized for clinical
utility (and the DSM-IV and ICD-10 purport
to do this) without ultimately sacriﬁcing valid-
ity. Goals such as clinical utility and validity do
not specify unique taxonomies, however. For
160 Hyman
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example, in the DSM-IV, autism is justiﬁably
classiﬁed as a developmental disorder (C. Walsh
et al. 2008), but a different system could have
reasonably classiﬁed autism primarily in terms
of deﬁcits in social cognition (Baron-Cohen &
Belmonte 2005, Losh et al. 2009).
In disease classiﬁcation, the gold standard is
either etiology or etiology modiﬁed by patho-
physiology (e.g., a single genetic mutation or
infectious agent may give rise to divergent
disease processes in some cases). For mental
disorders, etiologic and pathophysiologic infor-
mation is still sparse and thus cannot yet yield
valid disease deﬁnitions. The result is a clas-
siﬁcation based, of necessity, on phenomenol-
ogy. Given the extraordinary challenges that lie
ahead to gain understanding of the etiologies
and pathologic processes underlying mental
disorders, phenomenology must, in the main,
continue to play the dominant role in DSM-V
and ICD-11. The need to depend on phe-
nomenology, and therefore only surface char-
acteristics, will likely contribute to continued
errors (only to be discovered later) in the lump-
ing and splitting of symptom clusters into disor-
ders. The current classiﬁcation of mental disor-
ders can be analogized to the taxonomy of life
(see sidebar The Challenges of Classiﬁcation
in Living Systems) prior to the ability to ob-
serve evolutionary relationships and more re-
cently to sequence DNA: Convergent evolution
has given rise to similar traits many times, and
without deeper understandings, some of these
will inevitably be confounded.
Although there was no reasonable alterna-
tive to phenomenologically based diagnoses in
formulating the DSM-III (Am. Psychiatr. As-
soc. 1980), a series of contingent top-down de-
cisions were made that have, in my view, led to
problems. The need to rely on clinical obser-
vation instead of etiology or pathophysiology
did not entail the substantial (and arguably sci-
entiﬁcally premature) splitting of the universe
of psychopathology into many highly speciﬁed
disorders, nor did it require that essentially all of
psychopathology be parsed into discontinuous
categories (as opposed to some use of quantita-
tive or dimensional descriptions).
THE CHALLENGES OF CLASSIFICATION IN
LIVING SYSTEMS
The challenges of classiﬁcation in the life sciences are well illus-
trated by the most fundamental classiﬁcation project in biology,
the taxonomy of species, which in its current form dates from
Linnaeus (1707–1778). Since Darwin, the organizing principle
of the resulting tree of life has been the evolutionary relation-
ships among taxa rather than similarity of traits (phenotypes).
Thus, insects, birds, and bats are not immediate relatives even
though they have all separately evolved wings. The relationships
among species are not entirely a settled matter, however. Indeed,
there have been many recent adjustments to the tree of life as
burgeoning genomic information has supplemented phenotypic
observations (Dunn et al. 2008). Even as more complete genetic
data are generated, difﬁcult problems will remain. The classical
deﬁnition of a species is an interbreeding population of organisms
(a concept that assumes sexual reproduction). However, microor-
ganisms are haploid and generally reproduce asexually. Thus, the
concept of species that applies to plants and animals sits uneasily
with microorganisms. What is more, microorganisms may ex-
change DNA segments in processes unrelated to reproduction;
thus, evolutionary relationships cannot be deﬁned with the same
clarity as for plants or animals.
Disease
classification: a
listing of diseases
clustered by
relatedness, e.g.,
cancers, metabolic
diseases, infectious
diseases, unintentional
injuries. The
International
Classiﬁcation of Diseases
was initially developed
to facilitate statistical
reporting of causes of
mortality across
countries. For disease
classiﬁcation, the gold
standard is etiology
and pathophysiology
Although I argue that there are signiﬁcant
shortcomings to the deﬁnitions that the DSM-
III (Am. Psychiatr. Assoc. 1980) imposed on
mental disorders, it is also important to rec-
ognize that major disorders contained therein,
such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, autism,
major depression, and obsessive-compulsive
disorder, pick out highly replicable features of
psychopathology. The evidence includes the
stability of symptom clusters and clinical course
across historical time (Burton 1621) and across
cultures. For example, signiﬁcant syndromal
similarities have been described across coun-
tries and cultures for autism (Wakabayashi et al.
2007), schizophrenia ( Jablensky et al. 1992),
bipolar disorder (Fekadu et al. 2006), obsessive-
compulsive disorder (Matsunaga et al. 2008),
and other major disorders. In addition, many
of the major disorders exhibit a high degree of
familial aggregation (Kendler et al. 1997). Rec-
ognizable symptom clusters cohere within and
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Table 1 Relative risk of selected disorders compared with general population risk
Disorder
Population
prevalence λ1 Heritability
Autism (narrow) 0.2% 25 0.9
Autism (broad) 0.7% 25 0.9
Schizophrenia 1.0% 9 0.8–0.9
Bipolar disorder 1.0% 8 0.7–0.8
Major depression 17% 2–5 0.35
λ1 denotes fold elevation in risk of the disorder over population base rates for a ﬁrst-degree relative of an affected proband.
Thus, for example, the sibling of a person with schizophrenia has a nine-fold increased risk over the population prevalence
of 1%, i.e., a 9% risk of schizophrenia. Reprinted from Hyman 2008.
Quantitative or
dimensional
diagnosis: a disease,
disorder, or risk state
that is deﬁned on the
basis of one or more
quantitative scales that
are continuous with
normal. For example,
hypertension is
deﬁned in terms of two
dimensions, systolic
and diastolic blood
pressure. Thresholds
for diagnoses (and
often severity or stage
of disorder) are
generally based on the
correlation of
outcomes with the
relevant quantitative
measures
across generations, although not nearly with
the precision predicted by DSM-III and DSM-
IV diagnostic categories. Twin studies (Kendler
2001) and, where performed, adoption studies
(Kety et al. 1971, Sigvardsson et al. 1996),
suggest that much of familial aggregation
is explained by heredity. Indeed, autism,
schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder number
among the most heritable of common, genet-
ically complex illnesses (Table 1; Merikangas
& Risch 2003). If the major disorders were
arbitrary chimeras created by the original
DSM-III task force, the high levels of his-
torical and cross-cultural similarity, familial
aggregation, and heritability would be difﬁcult
to explain.
Even when genetic and nongenetic risk
factors for mental disorders are eventually iden-
tiﬁed, it will remain a challenge to draw disease
boundaries. This challenge derives from the
remarkable etiological complexity of common
mental disorders despite their substantial
heritability (see sidebar Genetically Complex
Disorders). Modern molecular genetic studies
(currently most advanced for autism,
schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder) indi-
cate that no single genetic variant will prove
either necessary or sufﬁcient for any of these
diagnoses (Happe et al. 2006, Int. Schizophr.
Consort. 2009) and that a very large number
of genes in different combinations contribute
to aggregate population risk of these and
other mental disorders. Indeed, there is strong
evidence for both shared and unshared genetic
risk factors among mood and anxiety disor-
ders (Kendler et al. 1992) and among autism,
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and a variety of
other psychotic disorders (Cardno et al. 2002;
Craddock et al. 2005, 2006; Green et al. 2005;
Int. Schizophr. Consort. 2009; Kilipinen et al.
2008; Lichtenstein et al. 2009). Given this com-
plexity and heterogeneity, which will be compli-
cated further when developmental and environ-
mental risk factors are identiﬁed with certainty,
I use the term “diagnostic validity” throughout
this review, not to suggest that there is some
Platonic ideal of autism or schizophrenia or any
other disorder, but rather as shorthand to sig-
nify deﬁnitions that capture families of closely
related disorders with similar pathophysiology.
THE INTELLECTUAL BASIS
OF DSM-III
Robins & Guze (1970) enunciated the
proximate intellectual underpinnings of the
DSM-III (Am. Psychiatr. Assoc. 1980); in turn,
they relied on the foundational work of Emile
Kraepelin (1899), who attempted to ground
the diagnoses of schizophrenia (dementia prae-
cox in his terminology) and bipolar disorder
(manic-depressive illness) on close observation,
especially taking the course of illness into ac-
count. Using schizophrenia as their example,
Robins & Guze (1970) argued that reliable and
valid diagnoses would follow from observations
in ﬁve domains: (a) clinical description, (b) lab-
oratory studies, (c) delineation of one disorder
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from another, (d ) follow-up studies (i.e., ob-
serving diagnostic stability over time), and
(e) family studies. They believed that as knowl-
edge accumulated, observations from these ﬁve
areas would converge on valid disorder deﬁni-
tions. In their view, the Kraepelinian empha-
sis on long-term follow-up was an important
indicator that a symptom cluster, observed at
one time in a patient’s life, represented a valid
disorder as opposed to an accidental conjunc-
tion of symptoms occurring at a single point
in time. Family studies might demonstrate that
particular symptom clusters were transmitted
from one generation to the next, again provid-
ing evidence that a diagnosis represented a nat-
ural kind (with shared etiological factors) rather
than a chance co-occurrence of symptoms in a
single individual. Their work motivated the de-
velopment of two sets of diagnostic criteria in-
tended for the identiﬁcation of homogeneous
populations for research, the Feighner criteria
(Feighner et al. 1972) and the research diagnos-
tic criteria (Spitzer et al. 1975). These, in turn,
became important models for the DSM-III
(Am. Psychiatr. Assoc. 1980). Indeed, Spitzer,
who led the development of the DSM-III (Am.
Psychiatr. Assoc. 1980), was lead author of
the research diagnostic criteria (Spitzer et al.
1975).
THE LIMITATIONS OF
CATEGORICAL DIAGNOSES
A signiﬁcant assumption made by Robins &
Guze (1970) was that mental disorders would
best be conceptualized as discrete categories,
discontinuous from each other and from
health. Indeed, the third validator in their list
of ﬁve was delineation of one disorder from
another, perhaps in reaction to psychoanalytic
approaches that saw all psychopathology on
a developmental continuum. A uniformly
categorical approach was subsequently adopted
by the Feighner and research diagnostic
criteria (Feighner et al. 1972, Spitzer et al.
1975) and, with one exception (mental retarda-
tion), wholly embraced by the DSM-III (Am.
Psychiatr. Assoc. 1980).
GENETICALLY COMPLEX DISORDERS
Despite the signiﬁcant role for genes in risk of common men-
tal disorders (Table 1), progress has been frustratingly slow in
identifying the precise genetic variants responsible. This difﬁ-
culty results, in part, from the lack of objective tests to deﬁne
phenotypes for genetic analysis. Perhaps the greater problem is
genetic complexity, which signiﬁes that there are diverse genetic
pathways involving large numbers of genes that contribute to
risk of any given disorder. Genetic complexity of mental disor-
ders was ﬁrst predicted from family studies because the patterns
of inheritance across generations did not exhibit what would be
predicted for disorders caused deterministically by single genes,
i.e., Mendelian dominant, recessive, or sex-linked patterns of in-
heritance. Similarly, studies comparing monozygotic twin pairs
(alike in 100% of their DNA) and dizygotic twin pairs (sharing
on average 50% of their DNA) also did not yield the predicted
Mendelian ratios.
At the extremes, diverse genetic pathways to similar disease
traits have been shown to result from (a) interactions among mul-
tiple genetic variants that are common in human populations, of-
ten described as the common disease–common variant hypothe-
sis, or from (b) diverse rare, highly penetrant mutations, with each
individual mutation causing disease in a small number of families.
An example that illustrates the common disease–common variant
hypothesis is maturity-onset (type 2) diabetes mellitus (Zeggini
et al. 2008). An example that illustrates the phenotypic conver-
gence of independent mutations in different families is retinitis
pigmentosa (Daiger et al. 2007, Pacione et al. 2003). In type 2 dia-
betes, the variants that contribute to risk are generally single base
changes in DNA, i.e., single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs)
that are not individually deleterious, but produce risk through in-
teraction with each other and with nongenetic factors. Retinitis
pigmentosa is caused by a large number of different deleteri-
ous mutations in different genes, each of which can act alone to
cause pigmentary degeneration of the retina and thus blindness.
In other words, each deleterious mutation acts as a single gene
“Mendelian” disorder within a family, but in aggregate, differ-
ent families are affected by a large number of distinct mutations
in different genes. Depending on the precise mutation inherited,
retinitis pigmentosa trait can be a dominant or recessive trait, and
the precise timing and severity of symptoms will differ.
SNPs can produce deleterious mutations, especially when
they inﬂuence protein structure or mRNA splicing. Copy number
variations (CNVs), which represent larger structural alterations
including deletions, insertions, duplications, or more complex
www.annualreviews.org • The Diagnosis of Mental Disorders 163
A
nn
u.
 R
ev
. C
lin
. P
sy
ch
ol
. 2
01
0.
6:
15
5-
17
9.
 D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 ar
jou
rna
ls.
an
nu
alr
ev
iew
s.o
rg
by
 1
28
.1
03
.2
38
.1
51
 o
n 
04
/0
6/
10
. F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
ANRV407-CP06-07 ARI 22 February 2010 15:10
genomic rearrangements, are more likely than SNPs to produce
biological effects by disrupting one or more genes or quantita-
tively altering gene expression. In addition to harboring millions
of SNPs, the human genome harbors substantial CNVs, some in-
herited across generations and some occurring de novo. The evi-
dence to date concerning the genetics of autism and schizophre-
nia suggests a middle ground between the models described for
type 2 diabetes and retinitis pigmentosa. Both common variants
and rare, highly penetrant mutations appear to play a role in
both disorders, with marked differences across individuals (Int.
Schizophr. Consort. 2008, 2009; Morrow et al. 2008; O’Donovan
et al. 2008; Shi et al. 2009; T. Walsh et al. 2008; Weiss et al. 2008;
Xu et al. 2008). There is less information to date about other
mental disorders, but progress is being made, most notably in
bipolar disorder (Ferreira et al. 2008, Int. Schizophr. Consort.
2009).
Categorical
diagnosis: a disease,
disorder, or risk state
that can be
qualitatively separated
from being well and
also from other
diseases or disorders,
e.g., tuberculosis or
chronic myelogenous
leukemia
An alternative approach, common in gen-
eral medicine, is to represent some disorders
as quantitative (or dimensional) rather than
qualitative deviations from health. Examples of
disorders that are most usefully represented as
categories are pneumococcal pneumonia and
small cell carcinoma of the lung. Disorders (in-
cluding risk states) better represented as quanti-
tative deviations from health include type 2 dia-
betes mellitus, hypertension (which is measured
along two dimensions, systolic and diastolic
blood pressure), and dyslipidemias (which are
measured along multiple dimensions, includ-
ing different fractions of serum cholesterol and
triglycerides). A categorical classiﬁcation logi-
cally posits discontinuities or “zones of rarity”
in symptom distributions that provide natural
boundaries between disorders and between dis-
order and health (Kendell & Jablensky 2003). In
contrast, when disorders are represented quan-
titatively, they are understood to be continu-
ous with normalcy, lacking sharp discontinuities
that would support a qualitative separation.
Because dimensional disorders are con-
tinuous with normalcy, diagnostic thresholds
must be set, ideally grounded in empirical
outcomes data. For hypertension and hyper-
cholesterolemia, multiple thresholds have been
set based on current follow-up data that create
modiﬁable de facto categories or “bins” that call
for different levels of clinical response ranging
from vigilant follow-up to behavioral measures
to increasingly potent medical interventions.
Although guided by data, the selection of
thresholds for diagnosis and treatment is a
matter of policy. For example, longitudinal
studies have documented levels of increasing
risk of cardiovascular events that correspond
to increasing levels of low-density lipoprotein
(LDL) cholesterol, systolic blood pressure,
or diastolic blood pressure. Such information
is then used to set (and recently to revise)
thresholds for diagnosis and intervention
(Chobanian et al. 2003, Grundy et al. 2004).
Interestingly, recent revisions to thresholds
for intervention in hypercholesterolemia
were inﬂuenced by the safety and efﬁcacy of
LDL-cholesterol-lowering statin drugs. Al-
though the diagnosis of mental disorders lacks
the intrinsically quantitative laboratory mea-
sures used for diabetes, hypertension, or lipid
disorders, variations in behavior, severity of
symptoms, and levels of impairment have long
been represented successfully on quantitative
scales.
For mental disorders that can appropri-
ately be represented by quantitative dimen-
sions, scores on the relevant symptoms scales
could be correlated with outcomes, such as pro-
gression to greater symptom severity, devel-
opment of additional symptoms, or worsening
measures of functional impairment. The results
of such research would better justify thresholds
for diagnosis and treatment than currently exist.
For the present, clinicians are forced to make an
intuitive judgment call, often based on a “clini-
cal signiﬁcance” criterion that is included with
the symptom lists of many disorders. To meet
criteria for Major Depression, for example, it
is required not only that the person meet the
required symptom count, but also that: “The
symptoms cause clinically signiﬁcant distress
or impairment in social, occupational, or other
important areas of functioning” (Am. Psychi-
atr. Assoc. 1994). This approach fails both be-
cause it denies an appropriate clinical status to
early or milder symptom presentations (Keller
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et al. 1983, Shankman et al. 2009), thus im-
peding preventive interventions, and because
it does not answer the criticism of excessive
medicalization of life problems (Healy 2006).
Indeed, the current positioning of the clinical
signiﬁcance criterion in many disorder deﬁni-
tions of the DSM-IV illogically confounds a
severity measure with a symptom list (Sartorius
2009). Empirically grounded, graded diagnos-
tic thresholds, as exist for hypertension, would
seem to require a separation of symptoms and
signs from severity measures even for categor-
ical disorders.
Perhaps the major problem with the cate-
gorical approach is that for many disorders in
the DSM-IV, there is no evidence for disconti-
nuities in symptom proﬁles (zones of rarity) and
often evidence for the opposite. Disorders in
which evidence favors a dimensional approach
include major depression (Kendler & Gardner
1998), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Mataix-
Cols et al. 2005), autism (Di Martino et al.
2009, Hoekstra et al. 2007), attention deﬁcit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD; Hudziak et al.
2005), and personality disorders (Skodol et al.
2002a,b). For all these diagnoses, symptoms
listed in their criterion sets are also normally
distributed in the general population. The di-
mensional nature of personality disorders has
long been argued (Skodol et al. 2002a,b; Widi-
ger & Mullins-Sweatt 2009). Parenthetically,
beginning with the DSM-III (Am. Psychiatr.
Assoc. 1980), personality disorders have also
been subject to what can only be described as an
arbitrary and scientiﬁcally strange decision to
be separated from other disorders on a separate
diagnostic axis, Axis II. Subsequent research has
found no convincing scientiﬁc justiﬁcation for
this separation (New et al. 2008; Siever & Davis
1991; Skodol et al. 2002a,b).
The only clearly dimensional representation
of disorder in the DSM-IV is mental retarda-
tion (also listed on Axis II even though autism, a
common cause of mental retardation, is an Axis
I disorder). This dimensional representation
is entirely appropriate given the continuous
distribution of IQ in the population. Indeed,
it has been argued that mental retardation
could provide a model for the adoption of
dimensional deﬁnitions in the DSM-V
(Widiger & Trull 2007) as well as a model
for the use of a standardized psychological
test as a laboratory measure in diagnosis
(Widiger & Clark 2000). Mental retardation
is complex, with diverse causes ranging from
speciﬁc mutations such as trisomy 21 to spe-
ciﬁc gene-environment interactions as occur
in untreated phenylketonuria to presumed
interactions of many common genetic variants
with developmental and environmental factors.
Despite known speciﬁc causes and many more
still unknown, IQ remains a clinically useful
and predictive clinical dimension in that an
IQ of 70 or below has been convincingly
correlated with signiﬁcant impairment.
Research from animal models, cognitive
neuroscience, brain imaging, and pharma-
cology have produced strong arguments that
addictive disorders (Hyman et al. 2006) and
some anxiety disorders (Yehuda & LeDoux
2007) represent excessive activation of normal
neural mechanisms within reward and fear
circuits, respectively. For example, several
anxiety disorders, most clearly posttraumatic
stress disorder, may result from a quantitative
imbalance between normal processes of fear
conditioning and of extinction or reappraisal
(Rauch et al. 2006, Yehuda & LeDoux 2007).
On this model, failure of some individuals to
recover fully from broadly expectable effects of
trauma suggests a biological mechanism that is
continuous with normalcy. In ADHD, a recent
longitudinal structural neuroimaging study that
examined changes in cortical thickness with
age concluded that symptoms result from mat-
urational delay, especially of prefrontal cortex,
but not from a qualitatively abnormal pattern
of cortical development (Shaw et al. 2007).
Employment of categorical approaches to
disorders that are better represented as quan-
titative deviations from health is not simply
an arcane matter of taxonomy, but also cre-
ates signiﬁcant problems for clinical practice
and research. In development of clinical prac-
tice guidelines, the ﬁction of a qualitative sep-
aration from normalcy creates obstacles to
www.annualreviews.org • The Diagnosis of Mental Disorders 165
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setting and later revising data-driven thresh-
olds for diagnosis and intervention of dimen-
sional disorders. Lacking information that links
outcomes quantitatively to symptoms, it is dif-
ﬁcult for clinicians to justify early interventions
that might prevent severe psychopathology or
interventions for milder but impairing symp-
toms (Keller et al. 1983, Shankman et al. 2009).
Clinicians are forced to make “subthreshold” or
atypical diagnoses ( Jackson et al. 2007), which
are not likely to be insured, or to engage in
diagnostic “bracket creep” in order to gain re-
imbursement for treatment.
The conceptualization of ADHD as a
category discontinuous from normalcy is not
only implausible, but also inhibits the kind of
research that would improve the clinical utility
of the diagnosis and perhaps its validity. DSM-
IV calls for the diagnosis of ADHD when six or
more symptoms of inattention (speciﬁed in a
list) and six or more symptoms of hyperactivity
and impulsivity (from other lists) have persisted
for at least six months “to a degree that is mal-
adaptive and inconsistent with developmental
level” (Am. Psychiatr. Assoc. 1994). These arbi-
trary symptom counts do not provide effective
tools for family doctors and other primary care
practitioners, who evaluate the majority of chil-
dren for ADHD, to make a diagnosis against
the moving developmental target of brain mat-
uration (Angold et al. 2000). If ADHD were in-
stead portrayed as quantitative deviations from
the mean on scales of attention, hyperactivity,
and impulsiveness, benchmarked for age, then
thresholds for diagnosis and treatment could
be set in analogy to how pediatricians measure
children against standardized growth curves.
From a policy point of view, individuals con-
cerned with overdiagnosis or underdiagnosis
could, for the most part, be engaged in debates
on where to set thresholds for treatment rather
than in current debates as to whether ADHD
exists at all as a category distinct from health.
The development, where appropriate, of
quantitative scales that are both scientiﬁcally
justiﬁed and clinically useful for the diagno-
sis and treatment of mental disorders will be
a challenging process, proceeding over years.
Undoubtedly, this process will begin with clin-
ically ascertainable scales, but will eventu-
ally involve cognitive measures and, in the
more distant future, perhaps structural or func-
tional brain imaging and other technologically
based measures. Given that the revisions of the
DSM-IV and the ICD-10 are well under way,
the process of developing and testing quanti-
tative measures will, in most cases, have to lag
the initial publications of DSM-V and ICD-11.
Fortunately, both the American Psychiatric As-
sociation (Regier et al. 2009) and World Health
Organization have committed to making
DSM-V and ICD-11 living documents. This
policy has the beneﬁt that quantitative scales
will not have to be developed for artiﬁcial publi-
cation deadlines, but can be added later without
having to wait a decade or more for DSM-VI
and ICD-12.
THE PROBLEM OF
OVERSPECIFICATION
Basing diagnoses of heterogeneous forms of
psychopathology on rigid, highly speciﬁed lists
of operationalized criteria trades interrater reli-
ability for the exclusion of a signiﬁcant number
of individuals who by other measures would be
counted as affected. Problems created by rigid
overspeciﬁcation are exempliﬁed by comparing
diagnoses made with DSM-IV (Am. Psychiatr.
Assoc. 1994) and ICD-10 (World Health Org.
1992) for disorders in which the intention was
to identify the same patients. Although there
are some principled disagreements between the
DSM-IV and the ICD-10, many of the differ-
ences in operationalized criteria are the acci-
dental results of having two parallel processes of
criterion writing. Slade & Andrews (2001) used
a single structured interview, the Composite In-
ternational Diagnostic Interview, administered
to a community sample of 10,641 people, to
derive DSM-IV and ICD-10 diagnoses. They
found that small differences in wording resulted
in the identiﬁcation of different individuals as
being affected. In a smaller sample enriched for
prevalence of mental disorders, Andrews et al.
(1999) found a concordance between DSM-IV
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and ICD-10 criteria of 83% for a depressive
episode, only 64% for obsessive-compulsive
disorder, and only 35% for posttraumatic stress
disorder. Thus, the operationalized criteria of
DSM-IV and ICD-10 criteria are so rigid as to
exclude large numbers of plausibly affected in-
dividuals (indeed identiﬁed by the cognate sys-
tem) who are likely in need of treatment.
Among users of the DSM-IV, the rigidity
and narrowness of diagnostic criteria result in
the widespread use of Not Otherwise Spec-
iﬁed (NOS) diagnoses. The result is an odd
paradox: Some patients are placed into a nar-
rowly deﬁned box, and others, who do not pre-
cisely match the DSM-IV criteria, are placed in
a largely unspeciﬁed residual category. The rel-
ative percentage of NOS diagnoses used in clin-
ical settings varies according to disorder clus-
ters and the care with which different clinical
communities attend to DSM-IV criteria. It ap-
pears, however, that NOS diagnoses may ap-
proach a majority in the autism spectrum (de
Bruin et al. 2007), eating disorders (Fairburn &
Bohn 2005), and personality disorders (Verheul
et al. 2007). Overall, a signiﬁcant fraction of pa-
tients who present in primary care settings do
not ﬁt the highly speciﬁed criteria of the dis-
orders named within the DSM-IV and receive
an NOS diagnosis with unpredictable implica-
tions for treatment intervention ( Jackson et al.
2007).
Objective tests (unless they involve a difﬁ-
cult and operator-dependent laboratory proce-
dure) are intrinsically more reliable than clini-
cal observation. It is also the case that objective
medical tests, such as measurements of systolic
and diastolic blood pressure or glucose toler-
ance, are less likely to overspecify features of
a disorder than the operationalized criteria of
DSM-IV. The most useful objective tests are
selected to capture a meaningful group that can
then be subdivided by additional tests and clini-
cal observation. In contrast, a classiﬁcation that
prioritizes interrater reliability but is based on
phenomenology takes on the risks that are well
exempliﬁed by the DSM-IV: a highly speciﬁed,
but in the end, arbitrary list of inclusion and
exclusion criteria. When combined with the
categorical approach of the DSM-IV, with its
rigid and equally arbitrary thresholds, it is not
surprising that many patients fall into NOS cat-
egories or must be described as “atypical.”
THE PROBLEM OF
COMORBIDITY
Comorbidity is so extensive among DSM-IV
diagnoses (Kessler et al. 2005b) as to forcefully
raise questions about the underlying structure
and assumptions of the classiﬁcation (Kendell
& Jablensky 2003). Of course among general
medical disorders and mental disorders alike,
individuals may have multiple illnesses with in-
dependent etiologies or may have one condi-
tion that is an independent risk factor for an-
other. Thus, for example, smoking and diabetes
are independent risk factors for atherosclero-
sis, and mania is a risk factor for substance use
disorders (Regier et al. 1990). Much of the un-
ease about comorbidity among mental disor-
ders results from the fact that rates are very
high (often the majority of patients in clinical
settings) within “families” or clusters of re-
lated illnesses. Thus, for example, comorbid-
ity is characteristic of individuals with diag-
noses of mood and anxiety disorders (Clark et al.
1995; Kessler et al. 2005a,b; Mineka et al. 1998;
Mofﬁtt et al. 2007) and personality disorders
(McGlashan et al. 2000, Skodol 2002a). It is
also common within certain groups of child-
hood disorders, including ADHD (Galanter
& Leibenluft 2008, Goldstein & Schwebach
2004), obsessive-compulsive “spectrum” disor-
ders (Pallanti & Hollander 2008), and psychotic
disorders (Fraguas et al. 2007). The open ques-
tion raised by these observations is whether
individuals with comorbidity within a family
of disorders are better understood as having
two or more distinct DSM-IV (Am. Psychi-
atr. Assoc. 1994) disorders or as having a single
disorder in which complex etiological factors
give rise to diverse symptom complexes that
may change with time and environmental expo-
sures (Cardno et al. 2002, Kendler et al. 1992,
Krueger & Markon 2006). If a substantial frac-
tion of comorbidity is an artifact of excessive
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splitting of pathophysiologically closely related
conditions, then the situation is clearly exac-
erbated by the hard boundaries stipulated by
operationalized criteria between putatively cat-
egorical disorders.
Historically, there was an attempt to sup-
press the high levels of comorbidity potentially
created by the DSM-III (Am. Psychiatr. Assoc.
1980) by including an “exclusion criterion” in
many DSM-III disorder deﬁnitions. The exclu-
sion criterion stipulated that a disorder could
not be diagnosed if it was “due to another
disorder.” This criterion depressed rates of co-
morbidity by forcing a single primary diagnosis
in many situations. The analogy might be to
diabetes mellitus where subsequent kidney dis-
ease (diabetic nephropathy) might be subordi-
nated to the underlying disorder even if recog-
nized as a clinical entity requiring independent
treatment. Among mental disorders, this hier-
archical approach was found to be essentially
impossible to operationalize (Robins 1994). For
example, it was often unclear in a given pa-
tient which disorder (e.g., depression or an anxi-
ety disorder) should be considered primary and
which secondary. The exclusion criterion was
thus removed from the Diagnostic and Statisti-
cal Manual of Mental Disorders, third edition,
revised (DSM-III-R; Am. Psychiatr. Assoc.
1987), with the result that the high prevalence
of comorbidity was unmasked (Kessler et al.
1996).
The observation that comorbidity may be
more common than pure “types” within some
domains of psychopathology (Mofﬁtt et al.
2007) suggests a state of affairs in which arti-
ﬁcial diagnostic silos were created by the com-
bination of exuberant splitting and the highly
speciﬁed, operationalized criteria of DSM-III
(Am. Psychiatr. Assoc. 1980). During the de-
velopment of DSM-III, the process of splitting
larger clusters into more speciﬁc disorders
elicited substantial debate and disagreement
(Lane 2007), but these disagreements have
largely disappeared, not because of scientiﬁc
progress, but rather, I would argue, because
named disorders became passively accepted and
reiﬁed.
Comorbidity is not simply a matter of
concern for health statistics and epidemiology.
Given the status of the DSM-IV in the scientiﬁc
and regulatory ﬁrmament, all clinical trials for
drug registration and most clinical trials overall
are conducted among patients diagnosed with a
single, “pure” DSM-IV disorder. In some areas
of psychopathology, these individuals may ac-
tually represent an atypical minority of those in
need of treatment (Mofﬁtt et al. 2007). Recent
large clinical trials that enrolled more realistic
populations, such as the Sequenced Treatment
Alternatives to Relieve Depression (STAR∗D),
have found that treatments efﬁcacious for
pure DSM-IV disorders, such as Major De-
pression, are less so in the large fraction of
patients who have additional symptoms such
as anxiety (Howland et al. 2009, Rush et al.
2006).
In order to serve the long-term needs of
research, including treatment development,
and of clinical care, the DSM-V should be
structured to facilitate a bottom-up reanalysis
of the historically premature and possibly
excessive splitting within domains of patho-
physiology stipulated by the DSM-IV (Am.
Psychiatr. Assoc. 1994). As I have argued
previously (Hyman 2007) and as I argue
below, this goal can be facilitated without
signiﬁcant disruption of current practice, at
least in the short term. Without requiring
change to the criteria for current disorders,
the diagnostic entities could be regrouped
into new large clusters or families based on
the best current etiological or neurobiolog-
ical hypotheses. Thus, for example, groups
could include fear-based anxiety disorders
(thought to reﬂect the interaction of amygdala-
based fear circuitry with prefrontal cortex),
an obsessive-compulsive disorder spectrum
(thought to involve frontal-striatal circuitry),
addictive and related impulse-control disor-
ders (that involve brain reward circuits), and
psychotic disorders, including what is now
classiﬁed as schizotypal personality disorder.
Regrouping of this kind, literally a change
in the organization of the table of contents,
can help move the relevant science forward
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if funding agencies and journals welcome
research that examines the implications of
new (or fewer) boundaries within these larger
clusters and tests dimensional approaches
that cut across current diagnostic silos. For
example, one could hold in abeyance the notion
that there are natural kinds, qualitatively differ-
ent from each other, called panic disorder, sim-
ple phobias, social phobia, and posttraumatic
stress disorder, and begin again with a cluster
based on dysregulated fear circuitry (Andrews
et al. 2009, Delgado et al. 2008, Rauch et al.
2006). Then from the bottom up, investigators
could determine whether the cognitive and
affective abnormalities, neurobiology, genetics,
symptoms, course, and treatment responses
were more effectively and parsimoniously
conceptualized using boundaries different
from DSM-IV or dimensionally rather than
categorically (Hyman 2007). The results of
such research might be incorporated into later
revisions of the DSM-V and ICD-11, or if very
extensive, could pave the way for DSM-VI and
ICD-12.
FAMILY AND GENETIC DATA
DO NOT CONFIRM DSM-IV
DISORDER BOUNDARIES
Far from providing the predicted validation
of schizophrenia or any other mental disor-
der as categories delineated from all others,
family and genetic studies have dramatically
undercut the Robins & Guze (1970) approach
to classifying psychopathology. When Robins
and Guze developed their conception of
major disorders as “pure types” deﬁned by
symptom clusters, laboratory tests, delineation
of one disorder from another, long-term
follow-up, and family studies, they could not
have imagined the high degree of genetic
complexity that would be found to characterize
mental disorders (see sidebar Genetically
Complex Disorders). An already large and
steadily accumulating body of data suggests
that as for other common diseases (Hunter
et al. 2008), the population risk of autism,
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and other
mental disorders results from the interaction
of a large number of different combinations
of genetic and nongenetic risk factors
(Craddock et al. 2006, Freitag 2007, Happe
et al. 2006, Int. Schizophr. Consort. 2009).
Within human populations, no single gene vari-
ant or genomic locus appears to be necessary or
sufﬁcient to produce any of the major, common
mental disorders. Evidence that is emerging
at an accelerating pace also suggests that in
different individuals, autism and schizophrenia
may result either from the interaction of a
large number of common genetic variants
(Ferreira et al. 2008, Int. Schizophr. Consort.
2009, O’Donovan et al. 2008) or from rare,
highly penetrant mutations (Int. Schizophr.
Consort. 2008, Morrow et al. 2008, T. Walsh
et al. 2008, Weiss et al. 2008, Xu et al. 2008),
perhaps acting against a risk-laden genetic
background produced by common variants
(Bodmer & Bonilla 2008). Highly penetrant
mutations may result from single-nucleotide
polymorphisms (SNPs) or more likely from
copy number variation (CNV). CNV may be
inherited (Millar et al. 2000) or may occur de
novo in the affected individual, leading to new
onset of disorder within a family that can be
passed to subsequent generations (T. Walsh
et al. 2008).
In addition to the remarkable etiologi-
cal heterogeneity of individual symptom com-
plexes, there is strong evidence that some
DSM-IV disorders (Am. Psychiatr. Assoc.
1994) share a subset of their genetic risk fac-
tors with other DSM-IV disorders. On the ba-
sis of twin studies, Kendler et al. (1992) have
adduced evidence of partly shared genetic risk
factors for major depression and generalized
anxiety disorder, which might explain the high
rates of comorbidity under the current diag-
nostic regime (Kessler et al. 2005a,b; Mofﬁtt
et al. 2007). On the basis of molecular genetic
studies, schizophrenia and bipolar disorder ap-
pear to have both shared and unshared genetic
risk factors (Int. Schizophr. Consort. 2009). In-
deed, family and molecular genetic studies of
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autism, schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder il-
lustrate the challenges for disorder deﬁnition
and classiﬁcation given the genetic complexity,
independent segregation of risk genes across
generations, and sharing of some risk genes
among different symptom clusters (and among
different DSM-IV disorders).
Many modern studies of families with
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder reveal that
signiﬁcant symptom clusters fail to cohere
across generations, giving rise to diverse
phenotypic variations, not all of which neatly
ﬁt DSM-IV criteria (Craddock et al. 2005,
2006). Indeed, single families may contain
individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia,
bipolar disorder, and intermediate conditions
such as DSM-IV schizoaffective disorder
(Berrettini 2000, Cardno et al. 2002, Laursen
et al. 2005, Lichtenstein et al. 2009). Such
scenarios likely reﬂect the precise mixture
of risk genes passed to each child as well as
developmental events involved in wiring the
brain and diverse environmental factors.
As noted, speciﬁc SNPs or CNVs are not
necessarily correlated with a single DSM-IV
diagnosis, an observation that suggests serious
drawbacks for gene-based diagnostic testing
in the near term. One dramatic example
comes from a Scottish family in which a
balanced translocation of a segment on chro-
mosome 1 was found to be associated, initially,
with schizophrenia. This segment contained
two genes that were named Disrupted in
Schizophrenia 1 and 2 (DISC1 and DISC2;
Millar et al. 2000, St. Clair et al. 1990).
Even within the index family, however, the
translocation was found, not only in individuals
with schizophrenia, but also in subjects with
schizoaffective disorder and recurrent major
depression (St. Clair et al. 1990). DISC1 has
emerged as a biologically compelling candidate
gene for risk of neuropsychiatric disorders that
has engendered additional study (Mao et al.
2009). Thus, in addition to the translocation
found in the initial Scottish family, the DISC1
gene has been found to harbor multiple SNPs
in other families. To date, variations in the
DISC1 sequence have been associated not only
with schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder,
bipolar disorder, and major depression, but
also with both broad and narrow phenotypes
of autism (Kilipinen et al. 2008).
These ﬁndings do not mean that cases
of DSM-IV schizophrenia or bipolar disor-
der never breed true, or that Kraepelin’s
distinction between dementia praecox
(schizophrenia) and manic depressive ill-
ness (bipolar disorder) is totally without
merit (Kraepelin 1899). Instead, the ﬁnd-
ings signify that schizophrenia and bipolar
disorder are etiologically and clinically het-
erogeneous syndromes rather than tightly
deﬁned categories as portrayed in the DSM-
IV (Fischer & Carpenter 2009). Moreover,
given the large number of genes that con-
tribute to schizophrenia and bipolar disorder,
mixing of parental risk genes in offspring
would be expected to give rise to diverse
intermediate forms of illness that would likely
include schizoaffective disorder and other
syndromes characterized by psychosis (Fanous
et al. 2001, Laursen et al. 2005, Lichtenstein
et al. 2009, Malhi et al. 2008). From the time
that DSM-III (Am. Psychiatr. Assoc. 1980) was
published, schizoaffective disorder has stood
out as stubbornly resistant to validation (Pope
et al. 1980). Given the etiological hypotheses
just described, it is not surprising that there
are many patients with both schizophrenia-like
symptoms and symptoms of a major mood
disorder. They are not well captured, in their
diversity, by a categorical system deﬁned by
operationalized criteria. Given the etiological
complexity just described, it is not surprising
that the Robins & Guze (1970) validators
have not converged onto natural kinds. The
wholesale adoption by the DSM-III (Am.
Psychiatr. Assoc. 1980) of phenomenologically
based operationalized criteria in the service
of interrater reliability, and of a wholly cat-
egorical approach to disorder, unwittingly
exacerbated the difﬁculty of capturing etiologi-
cally diverse and phenotypically heterogeneous
syndromes.
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WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
At the beginning of this review, I noted that
scientiﬁc understandings of the etiologies and
pathologic processes underlying mental ill-
nesses were still in early stages. Signiﬁcant
progress has been made in molecular genetic
analyses of risk for autism, schizophrenia, and to
a slightly lesser extent, bipolar disorder. There
is, however, a long way to go with respect to
these conditions, and progress has been slower
on the genetics of other forms of psychopathol-
ogy. There has also been real progress in neuro-
biology, but it has not yet reached a stage where
it can contribute usefully to individual disease
deﬁnitions. Given that signiﬁcant changes to
existing diagnostic criteria will be disruptive
to research, clinical practice, and to adminis-
trative applications of the DSM classiﬁcation,
it is important to ask whether the beneﬁts of
making changes outweigh possible negative ef-
fects at this stage of scientiﬁc knowledge. I
argue that the risk of doing nothing will, at a
minimum, impede the disease-related research
that is required to achieve a more valid clas-
siﬁcation in the coming years. The substantial
need for NOS criteria, excessive comorbidity,
the mismatch between real-world populations
and “pure” clinical trials samples, arbitrary and
rigid diagnostic thresholds, and the gulf be-
tween DSM-IV disorders and emerging results
of genetic studies all point to signiﬁcant fail-
ures inherent in the current DSM-IV classiﬁ-
cation. The problems that have emerged within
the DSM “paradigm” (based on operationalized
criteria that deﬁne a large number of categori-
cal disorders) cannot be ﬁxed by tinkering with
existing criteria sets or by adding or subtracting
diagnoses at the margins. Given the early state
of the science, however, the kind of changes
that I would prescribe for the DSM-V are not
replacing old ﬂawed guesses with new guesses
about disorder deﬁnitions. I believe that the
most useful modiﬁcations will be those that in-
vite scientists to move beyond currently reiﬁed
diagnoses in order to provide the information
that will lead, ultimately, to a valid classiﬁca-
tion. It is a good sign that the NIMH has begun
a program to develop new ways of classifying
mental disorders for research purposes, called
the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) initia-
tive, meant to incorporate data from genetics,
psychology, human and animal neurobiology,
and clinical trials. The DSM-V should ideally
be structured in a way that facilitates rather than
impedes such efforts.
In order to facilitate progress while mini-
mizing disruption, I argue that changes to ex-
isting criterion sets should only occur when
clear errors are identiﬁed or when quantita-
tive scales are fully ready for incorporation. I
argue, as I have previously (Hyman 2007), for
two signiﬁcant kinds of change in the DSM-V:
(a) the use of quantitative scales as alterna-
tives or supplements to current qualitative cri-
teria and (b) reclustering of disorder families
based on the most compelling current hypothe-
ses about underlying neural circuits or genetics.
As discussed, for many domains of psy-
chopathology, such as depression or ADHD,
dimensional approaches will likely capture clin-
ical and research data far more effectively than
do current categorical approaches. An advan-
tage of quantitative scales for clinical practice
is that by facilitating the correlation of scores
with distress, impairment, and risk of wors-
ening psychopathology over time, dimensional
approaches may provide a stronger basis for set-
ting disorder thresholds and for making treat-
ment decisions. One signiﬁcant possibility is
the development of dimensions that cut across
domains of psychopathology. For example, a
quantitative scale measuring depressed mood
(or elevated mood) would be useful not only
in the ultimate redeﬁnition of mood disorders,
but would be clinically useful for anxiety dis-
orders, obsessive-compulsive spectrum disor-
ders, and psychotic disorders where depres-
sion is often a fellow traveller. It is possible
that well-constructed mood dimensions used
along with anxiety and schizophrenia diagnoses
could obviate the need to make multiple diag-
noses or could confer clinical status on signiﬁ-
cant depressive symptomatology that does not
rise to the level of major depression. Moreover,
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such an approach might ultimately permit
the retirement of questionable categories such
as schizoaffective disorder (Fraguas et al.
2007).
The development and testing of useful
quantitative scales (e.g., for validity, reliability,
and clinical utility) and the empirically based
setting of diagnostic thresholds will not likely
occur rapidly. As noted, it is fortunate that the
DSM-V (Regier et al. 2009) and the ICD-11
will be treated as living documents to be up-
dated as appropriate. Ideally, quantitative scales
will be incorporated ﬁrst in parallel to existing
criteria, and ultimately as they are fully vetted
in terms of biological plausibility, epidemiol-
ogy, and clinical outcomes, they might replace
some current categorical diagnoses. As research
progresses, the initial scales, which will depend
on clinical observation, may well be replaced
with laboratory measures.
The second major change that I argue for is
reclustering of current disorders according to
the best current hypotheses about underlying
neural circuitry or compelling genetic data (Hy-
man 2007). Strong neurobiological or genetic
data do not exist for all disorders within the
DSM-IV, but for a number of major disorders,
such data are convincing enough to suggest
hypotheses about reaggregation of existing
DSM-IV disorders into large groups, clusters,
or spectra. Research, such as that which might
be supported by the NIMH RDoC initiative,
could focus on the cluster as a whole, rather
than on the current diagnostic silos, and lead to
a fresh bottom-up reanalysis. These reanalyses
could be based on such approaches as epidemi-
ology of symptom distribution and clustering
in healthy and clinical populations, cognitive
neuroscience and human neuroimaging in
healthy and clinical populations (Hoekstra
et al. 2007) or in healthy and ill twins or other
family members (Brans et al. 2008, Cannon
et al. 2002, Zainab et al. 2008). Also potentially
useful would be studies of familial aggregation
of symptoms clusters, segregation of symp-
toms across generations, studies to identify
risk genes, and genetic or environmentally
produced animal models. Such reanalyses of
large clusters might yield useful clinically based
symptom clusters that cohere in family studies,
or cognitive or neurobiologically based ﬁndings
that suggest new ways of dividing the cluster.
These analyses could also yield clinically
ascertained or laboratory-based dimensional
measures that transgress the boundaries of
current DSM-IV categorical disorders within
the cluster. The reclustering itself would have
little effect on current clinical practice, but
could, with the encouragement of funding
agencies and journal editors, help ultimately
to facilitate the much needed deconstruction
of reiﬁed diagnoses and encourage progress
toward a new, more valid classiﬁcation.
Examples of compelling neural circuit-
based hypotheses that could organize large
clusters include the fear-based anxiety disor-
ders (amygdala-based fear circuitry disorders),
the obsessive-compulsive disorder spectrum
(fronto-striatal disorders), addictive and other
impulse-control disorders (reward circuit dis-
orders), and disorders of frontal circuits and ex-
ecutive functioning that might include ADHD.
A psychosis cluster might be better orga-
nized today by shared genetic inﬂuences, given
the vast unknowns about underlying neural
circuits.
The fear-based anxiety disorders can serve
as an example of this reclustering approach.
This family of disorders is currently parsed by
DSM-IV (Am. Psychiatr. Assoc. 1994) into gen-
eralized anxiety disorder, simple phobias, post-
traumatic stress disorder, panic disorder, and
social phobia. There is substantial comorbid-
ity within this grouping and with depression
(Kessler et al. 2005b, Mofﬁt et al. 2007). Evi-
dence for categorical separation among these
disorders is not compelling. Imaging studies
reveal some differences in regional brain acti-
vation to aversive stimuli but generally report
shared hyperresponsiveness of the amygdala
to innocuous stimuli and failure of the amyg-
dala to exhibit normal desensitization when
repeated aversive stimuli do not prove harm-
ful. In addition, the prefrontal cortex fails
to activate robustly across multiple disorders,
thus failing to suppress abnormal amygdala
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activation (Etkin & Wager 2007; Nitschke et al.
2009; Shin et al. 2004, 2005; Yehuda & LeDoux
2007). Similar ﬁndings of excessive amygdala
activation correlate with trait anxiety in healthy
subjects (Etkin et al. 2004), suggesting that
there may be no categorical separation from
normalcy.
Lumping of the fear-based anxiety disorders,
or alternatively, pairing generalized anxiety dis-
order with depression (Kendler et al. 1992)
and clustering the remaining anxiety disorders,
might provide a new opportunity for discovery
of neural mechanisms, risk genes, and clinical
observations. Cross-cutting dimensional deﬁ-
nitions might be tested for validity and clin-
ical utility. The results of such approaches
are, of course, unpredictable. Nonetheless,
hypothesis-driven reclustering or lumping
of DSM-IV disorders according to neural
circuit or genetic data followed by system-
atic reanalysis with modern tools may be the
best way to escape the problem of reiﬁcation
without prematurely disrupting existing uses of
DSM-IV.
Neither the development of quantitative
dimensions nor agreement on reclustering
(and thus a new table of contents for the
DSM-V) will be easy. Nonetheless, to remain
cognitive prisoners of an excessively speciﬁed,
rigid categorical system based only on phe-
nomenology would seem as untenable scientif-
ically as it is clinically problematic. Epidemi-
ology, genetics, psychology, and neuroscience
have not been kind to the DSM-IV categories,
nor have these reiﬁed categories been kind to
science. The DSM-III was a brilliant advance
that prioritized interrater reliability; now it is
time to move on.
SUMMARY POINTS
1. DSM-III responded to a strong desire for interrater reliability by developing operational-
ized diagnostic criteria.
2. DSM-III and DSM-IV arbitrarily treat every disorder as a category discontinuous from
normal and from other disorders and eschew quantitative or dimensional approaches to
disorder descriptions.
3. DSM-III split large clusters of disorders, such as anxiety disorders, into a fairly large
number of disorders that have arguably become reiﬁed: They are treated as if they were
valid in most settings.
4. Evidence for excessive and scientiﬁcally premature splitting is the great degree of co-
morbidity among individuals with any DSM-IV diagnosis.
5. One result of promulgating highly speciﬁed operationalized criteria to describe hetero-
geneous disorders is that many patients meet no criteria and receive the diagnosis of Not
Otherwise Speciﬁed (NOS).
6. Family and molecular genetic studies map very poorly onto strict DSM-IV disorder
categories but help explicate the heterogeneity of clinical presentations.
7. Progress would seem to require seeing psychopathology afresh rather than through the
lens of the DSM-IV. One way of accomplishing this is to establish new large groupings
of disorders in the DSM-V based upon the most compelling current neurobiological and
genetic hypotheses followed by bottom-up reanalysis.
8. It is also time, with due care, to introduce quantitative scales into the DSM-V.
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